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Nationalisation is high on the policy agenda in South Africa. This paper considers 
the  case  for  nationalising  the  local  mining  sector  from  an  evidence-based 
perspective. The relevant evidence is derived from theoretical considerations and 
related to the known features of the South African mining sector and economy. A 
strong  case  against  nationalisation  emerges,  which  can  be  summarised  as 
follows:  The  mining  sector  is  competitive  and  therefore  a  poor  candidate  for 
public  ownership.  Further,  the  resources  sector  does  not  dominate  the  South 
African economy nor does it create the risk of Dutch Disease. Nationalising the 
mining sector will cost the government more than it receives. This is not only a 
bad idea in itself, but it will limit the scope for distributive policies on the national 
budget.  The  contemporary  international  experience  demonstrates  the  risks  of 
fiscal  imprudence.  Finally,  nationalising  the  resources  sector  will  undermine 
support  for  those  very  market-based  institutions  required  to  achieve  a  higher 
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1 Presidential address presented at the biennial conference of the Economic Society of South Africa, 5-7 September 
2011, Stellenbosch. I am grateful to Monique Reid for her valuable assistance in the preparation of this address.   3 
Introduction 
History did not, as it turns out, end twenty years and one month ago with the last gasp of 
the Soviet Union. Of course, the succession of events would not stop, but that was never 
the claim for which Francis Fukuyama became so famous; instead, he claimed that “… 
there is now no ideology with pretentions to universality that is in a position to challenge 
liberal democracy and no universal principal of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of 
the people … We have trouble imagining,” Fukuyama continued,“… a world that is 
radically better than our own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist” 
(Fukuyama, 1992: 45-46). 
While his perspective did not fix a particular role for the state in economic affairs – 
indeed, Fukuyama was explicitly agnostic on that point – the role of the productive state, 
as James Buchanan (for example in Buchanan and Musgrave, 2000) calls government‟s 
direct participation in the production of goods and services,  has as a matter of recorded 
history, been on the retreat since the 1980s in developed countries and elsewhere.  
The research focus of economists has followed suit. A generation ago, readers of the first 
edition  of  the  New  Palgrave  Dictionary  of  Economics  found  an  insightful  essay  on 
nationalisation  by  M.V.  Posner  (1987),  with  cross-references  to  entries  such  as 
privatisation, public utility pricing and socialism. Twenty years later, only an essay on 
privatisation by John Vickers (2008) appeared in the massively expanded second edition 
of the New Palgrave, with nationalisation nowhere to be found. This soft clue does not, I 
think, create a distorted picture of our profession‟s perspective on nationalisation as an 
important policy option since the 1980s.  
In South Africa, the policy debate followed a similar trajectory (see, e.g., the account in 
Parsons, 1999), as policy makers proceeded with modest privatisation during the mid-
1990s, having abandoned any further mention of possible nationalisation shortly after the 
political transition. Economists could, accordingly, be forgiven for their disbelief when 
nationalisation reappeared on the fringes of our public debate in 2008 whence it moved 
to the centre of the ruling coalition‟s policy agenda.  
While the ANC remains formally agnostic, and the smallest alliance partner the SACP is 
sceptical,  the  third  ally  COSATU  reversed  its  previous  lukewarm  comments  on 
nationalisation to enthusiastic advocacy in recent weeks. Indeed, COSATU‟s economist 
Chris Malekane has not only been a vigorous proponent of nationalisation, but has been   4 
quoted  as  saying  that  the  trade  union  federation  would  reject  any  report  critical  of 
nationalisation. COSATU is, at least in the mind of Malekane, only open to a discussion 
of different models of nationalisation (Shoba, 2011). A number of cabinet ministers have 
also given their support to the proposal (De Lange, 2011). And our press reported a 
national survey last month that indicated substantial public support, as much as 57% on 
the  West  Rand,  42%  on  average  for  Gauteng,  and  48%  in  Bloemfontein.  While 
nationalisation is distinctly less popular in the Western Cape and Eastern Cape, it enjoys 
nontrivial support at 27% in Cape Town and 25% in Port Elizabeth (Cropley, 2011).  
But  opinion  is  divided  at  the  highest  level:  Other  cabinet  minister  have  spoken  out 
against the proposal, including ministers Gordhan, Manuel, Gigaba and Shabangu, as 
well as ANC Secretary General Mantashe.  
In these circumstances, it does not seem prudent to dismiss the debate or engage only at 
the level of ideology. Governor Marcus of the Reserve Bank argued earlier this year that 
the  debate should  be non-ideological (Business  Day,  29 March 2011), and Professor 
Keeton from Rhodes University has been an admirably active participant in this debate 
with tools of economic reasoning at the ready
2.  
It is  to participate in this debate  that I  chose  an evidence-based assessment of the 
possible nationalisation of South African mines as the topic for this presidential address.  
1. Why do we care? 
Nationalisation raises so many issues that it pays to take a step back and use  the lens of 
economic theory to untangle the issues :  There is a conceptual world in  which the 
structure of ownership and the composition of balance sheets do not matter, at least not 
for the efficient  organisation of production. This is the world of perfectly enforceable 
contracts, zero transaction costs and so on. It is a world, so argued Ronald Coase (1937), 
where there would be no firms to nationalise; it is not where we find ourselves.  
When transactions costs
3 are positive,  areas of planning,  such as firms, facilitate the 
specialisation and  co-operation  which has driven the rise in productivity  behind  the 
dramatically increased living standards in developed countries (North, 1990). Formal and 
                                                        
2 Some of you would have heard his insightful paper with Gregory White at this conference, and if you did not, I urge 
you to download it from the conference website. 
3 Transaction costs include search costs (for price and location about other sellers and their wares); bargaining costs; 
drawing up contracts; monitoring contracts; enforcing contracts; protecting property; barriers to entry; agency costs; 
and co-ordination costs (2010: par. 88)   5 
informal rules of conduct – we call them institutions – structure our co-operation in 
these settings (North, 1991). In a discussion of nationalisation, we should be particularly 
interested in those institutions that create and sustain private property.  
In the world of the Coase theorem – with no transaction costs, comprehensive property 
rights and complete contracts – it would not matter, from an efficiency perspective, how 
property is allocated initially. But in our world, where these costs are not absent and 
property is only imperfectly defined and protected, the structure of corporate ownership 
matters greatly. Nationalisation, the transfer of ownership from private to government 
hands, is an institutional development with consequences of the first order. What this 
transfer  of  ownership  does  is  to  reassign,  to  the  public  sector,  the  right  to  make 
discretionary decisions in the firm‟s domain on all matters that have not been explicitly 
settled by contracts; what Oliver Hart (1995) calls the residual rights of control.  
To see how this will affect incentives for the nationalised firm, we can look at the three 
dimensions  of  institutions  in  North‟s  classic  definition  (North,  1984).  These  three 
aspects  of  institutions,  (i)  constraints  on  behaviour  (or  the  rules),  (ii)  monitoring 
mechanisms, and (iii) the consequences of observed conduct inconsistent with the rules 
provide a useful summary for the theoretical issues at stake.  
Starting with the constraints on behaviour, we run into an immediate difficulty. While 
there are reasonably developed theories on the behaviour of private firms to explain the 
conduct of the managers or agents who run these firms on behalf of the share-holding 
principals, no equivalent theory exists for firms in the public sector (Vickers, 2008).  
Of course, the public is, in some ultimate sense, the new principal of the nationalised 
firm. But we have conceptual difficulties in defining what would serve the welfare of the 
new principals: the highest net worth for the public sector is one possibility, or perhaps 
alternatives such as distributional goals or employment. To some, for example Sinnot, 
Nash and La Torre (2010), these alternatives suggest a trade-off between productivity 
and equality in this discussion. 
We also have a formidable public choice literature, which points to the many factors 
other than the goals of the public as principal that are likely to influence the decisions of 
managers at the  nationalised  firm,  including political  considerations,  the  influence  of 
lobbyists and other special interests, the difficulty faced by the public to write „complete 
contracts‟ for the managers, and many more (Schleiffer, 1998; Vickers, 2008).    6 
Not only are the goals different for public firms, but so too are the mechanisms that 
monitor the behaviour of public sector managers (Alchain, 1977). There is no possibility 
for shareholder oversight with the intensity experienced on financial markets, nor the 
ability  to  tie  managerial  incentives  to  stock  market  performance,  as  an  external 
assessment of the company‟s performance. Finally, there is no threat of take-over in the 
public sector, a threat which disciplines agents in a competitive private sector.  
Mentioning potential take-overs leads me from the monitoring mechanisms to the final 
aspect of North‟s three-part definition, the consequences of behaviour given the rules 
and norms. Apart from sidestepping the threat of take-overs, public sector managers are 
also not disciplined by the threat of bankruptcy. The repeated bailouts of large state-
owned enterprises in South Africa in recent years is a familiar demonstration of the „soft‟ 
budget constraints that frequently arise in these cases.  
To  summarise  these  points,  managers  of  a  nationalised  firm  face  different  and  less 
determinate  goals,  are  monitored  differently  and  possibly  less  effectively,  and  face 
different  consequences  when  they  act  inconsistently  with  the  goals  of  their  public 
principals.  
The contrast between the institutions of the private and nationalised firm will be greater, 
the  more  competitive  the  private  industry  was  prior  to  nationalisation.  This  is  an 
important  theoretical  result,  and  we  will  see  its  empirical  echo  in  the  discussion  of 
nationalisation‟s track record. Since this result is an extension of the fundamental welfare 
theorem  (see  for  example,  Feldman,  1987),  it  follows  that  the  theoretical  results  are 
conditional, and Laffont and Tirole (1993) have long since showed that theory cannot 
settle the question of public versus private sector efficiency in the production of goods 
and services; we will have to study the data.  
In  addition  to  these  microeconomic  consequences  I  have  already  mentioned, 
nationalisation also has fiscal consequences. Both nationalisation and privatisation can be 
motivated by the desire to improve public finances. Since nationalisation typically implies 
a debt-financed buy-out of private shareholders, the net impact on government‟s fiscal 
position  will  be  determined  by  (i)  government‟s  cost  of  finance,  (ii)  the  subsequent 
financial performance of the nationalised firms, which is, in turn, (iii) influenced by the 
scope and enthusiasm for profit-seeking investment by government in the future.    7 
In addition to these fiscal consequences, nationalisation has distributional consequences, 
and these are likely to be very important in the South African debate. If the firm is 
nationalised at market value (an issue I will discuss later in the South African context), 
then the immediate action is neutral from a distributional perspective. But subsequent 
decisions by firms operating under the incentives created by nationalisation are not likely 
to be similarly neutral: government‟s budget, the main vehicle for redistribution in South 
Africa, will be affected by the financial burden of nationalisation.  
Nationalised firms, especially those that become public utilities, typically employ various 
cross subsidisation schemes, with distributional consequences (Vickers, 2008). The same 
is true of a potentially more accommodating employment policy by the nationalised firm, 
less focussed on cost containment than a private sector firm.   
Finally,  Biais  and  Perotti  (2002)  suggested  a  channel  along  which  the  distributional 
consequences  of  privatisation  or  nationalisation  might  be  used  to  shape  political 
preferences:  their  argument  was  that  widespread  ownership  of  firms  would  create 
stakeholders with political incentives to maintain secure property rights. Nationalisation 
works  in  the  opposite  direction,  making  more  people  dependent  on  the  productive 
decisions of the state, with little incentive to maintain the institutions that support private 
business.  
Let us see if this theoretical perspective can help us understand the nationalisation debate 
we have seen unfolding in South Africa.  
2. Can we understand why the debate has gained such traction? 
I have already mentioned that the case for nationalisation had few champions for the last 
twenty years, but I did not mention that we have seen enthusiasm for nationalisation wax 
and wane before. In the immediate post-War era, the case seemed strong, and by the late 
seventies, state-owned enterprises accounted for about 10% of world GDP. A period of 
scepticism and roll-back followed in the 1980s and 1990s, lowering the state‟s share in 
global output by 40% by the early 2000s (Meggison and Netter, 2001). In some countries, 
nationalisation  has  lately  staged  a  comeback,  and  these  cycles  have  been  described 
recently by, inter alia, Manzano and Monaldi (2008), Rosa and Pérard (2010) and Chang, 
Hevia and Loayza (2010). 
Through  the  theoretical  lens  I  mentioned  earlier,  we  can  disentangle  the  various 
arguments  used  by  proponents  of  nationalisation  in  practice.  There  are  four  major   8 
strands to this argument, three of which follow directly from the theory, that is (i) an 
efficiency claim (often tied to a publics goods or natural monopoly argument), (ii) a fiscal 
claim (often tied to natural resource rents) and (iii) distributional claims, often in very 
unequal societies. Finally, international financial considerations, such as, a concern with 
Dutch Disease, might provide a fourth reason for nationalisation.  
As stated, there is no time perspective in these arguments, and that will not help us to 
understand the waves of nationalisation and privatisation we have seen over the last 
century.  One  explanation  is  that  preferences  shifted:  governments  used  to  favour  a 
laissez faire approach, but after WWII the preferences of developed countries in the 
West  and  in  the  developing  world  evolved  to  favour  a  social  democracy  and 
nationalisation, only to evolve again towards  so-called neoliberalism and privatisation 
after 1980. Since psychological explanations will not go far to explain the evolution of 
policy, one is largely left with an ideological account along this route, and the goal paper 
was to avoid a mainly ideological discussion.   
An alternative approach, and the one preferred here, is to take government‟s preferences 
as fixed for the purposes of the analysis and to ask what else might have changed to 
make  nationalisation  more  attractive  given  these  preferences.  As  Stigler  and  Becker 
(1977) would have advised, I look for the explanation within economics first, and only 
turn  to  political  science,  sociology  or  social  psychology  if  the  economic  analysis  is 
unproductive.  
To use the framework mapped our earlier, we need to look for shifts in (i) the efficiency 
prospects of firms in the public sector, (ii) fiscal changes, or (iii) changes in income 
and/or wealth distribution to explain a change in enthusiasm for nationalisation. There is 
a  small  literature  to  turn  to  on  this  matter,  listing  stylised  facts  correlated  with  the 
succession of nationalisations and privatisations as in Chang et al. (2010) or as predictors 
of nationalisation as in Duncan (2006) for a range of major minerals, and in Guriev, 
Kolotilin and Sonin (2011) for oil.  
Four of these might add up to a fiscal case for nationalising mining companies in South 
Africa; they are:  
1.  Firstly, that nationalisation occurs much more frequently in the natural resources 
sector and in utilities than in other sectors of the economy.   9 
2.  Secondly, the occurrence of nationalisation in the resources sector is positively 
correlated with the real price of these commodities: high commodity prices have 
been associated with nationalisation and low real prices with privatisation.  
3.  This can partly be understood from the third stylised fact, that private natural 
resource  companies  typically  operate  with  contracts  that  allow  them  to 
appropriate the windfalls from commodity booms.  
4.  And  the  integration  of  commodity  markets  internationally  brings  about  the 
fourth stylised fact, that waves of nationalisation are often common to several 
countries.  
Reading these four together gives us one possible explanation for the local policy agenda 
and the observed rise of nationalisations in the resources sector in Latin America in 
recent years. This is not to deny that President Morales in Bolivia and President Chavez 
in  Venezuela  have  ideological  arguments  for  nationalisation.  That  the  ANC  Youth 
League (ANCYL) also has an ideological agenda is plain for all to see; indeed they insist 
on it (ANCYL, 2010).  
The argument is, however, that these ideological arguments find fertile ground when 
commodity prices are higher, as they have been in recent years, and the proposal then 
follows to nationalise those companies that are perceived to enjoy unfair windfalls from a 
commodity boom.  
Venezuela and Bolivia also share a fifth stylised fact identified by Chang et al. (2010) and 
studied more systematically by Chua (1995), namely that endemic or rising inequality is 
positively correlated with nationalisation, especially when the windfall gains from high 
resources prices are perceived to be distributed unequally.  
Turning  now  to  the  South  African  debate  we  can  as  which  of  these  factors  appear 
relevant  locally?  As  far  as  my  reading  could  detect,  those  keen  on  nationalising  the 
mining sector in South Africa have not employed efficiency arguments in their cause. We 
have not heard that South African mines are inefficient, that the sector is uncompetitive 
or shown the symptoms of market failure. But we have heard that the nationalised mines 
will have different goals from those pursued by the current crop of private sector mining 
houses. The state should use the mines “… to guarantee the flow of resources to critical 
sectors in our economy”, the ANCYL argued in February 2010, “… not in order to 
maximise profit as the current holders of licenses do” (ANCYL, 2010: par. 24). These   10 
points  will  be  important  to  bear  in  mind  when  the  historical  track  record  of 
nationalisation is considered in the next section.  
In contrast to efficiency claims, fiscal and distributional claims have dominated the local 
discussion. The ANCYL plan for nationalising the mines of May 2010, for example, 
argues  that  “…  the  massive  poverty  challenges,  unemployment  and  unequal  spatial 
development realities call for an urgent focus on mineral resources” (ANCYL, 2010: par. 
5).  
In democracies, it is not enough to propose a policy, you have to win electoral support 
for it. At this point, Duncan‟s (2006) demonstration that natural resource expropriation 
has been more likely under democracies becomes relevant, and Pint (1990) gave us the 
Public Choice explanation for it, that is that the beneficiaries of nationalisation are often 
concentrated, notably organised labour, while the costs are diffuse and shared by current 
and future tax payers (Pint, 1990). In a democratic system, there is therefore a policy 
incentive to pursue nationalisation, possibly sacrificing longer-run economic efficiency 
for  short-run  political  benefits.  Unsurprisingly  then,  resource  nationalisation  has  also 
been more common in countries where the economy, and hence the tax base, are heavily 
reliant on one or a few commodities (Kobrin, 1984; Minor, 1994). COSATU‟s recent 
strong support for nationalisation is consistent with this story.  
This adds up to an explanation of the nationalisation debate in South Africa, with the 
following elements: start with the high level of income (and wealth) inequality, which 
Prof. Leibbrandt discussed on this stage at our previous conference. Add to this a few 
years of higher commodity prices and the perception that the windfall from these prices 
has been distributed such that inequality is not lowered and may be increased, together 
with a democratic political system where a populist leader can mobilise support to serve a 
majoritarian goal, and we have the South African debate on nationalisation.  
3. What empirical evidence should inform the debate? 
Let  me  now  turn  to  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  consequences  of  nationalisation, 
because the theoretical ambiguities leave no alternative if one wishes to avoid an outright 
ideological discussion. What empirical evidence should be summoned in this debate? 
There are two major approaches. The first entails investigating the assumptions, which 
theory tells us will distinguish efficient from inefficient nationalisation. The case to make   11 
is that the private market fails in some way and that government can improve on the 
situation by a transfer of ownership.  
This last point about government‟s ability to improve on the situation is not trivial, as we 
have discovered many reasons why governments may do worse even where the private 
market fails demonstrably. “All solutions have costs”, Coase wrote in 1960, “… and 
there is no reason to suppose that governmental regulation is called for simply because 
the problem is not handled well by the market or the firm” (Coase, 1960). The same goes 
for government ownership.  
Typically, the assumptions that require investigating in this approach are whether the 
good or service is a “public good” in the given context, whether there are important 
externalities,  what  the  degree  of  competition  is  in  the  private  market,  and  whether 
information costs are a notable problem (Meggison and Netter, 2001: 329).  
No strong case has been made locally, or internationally, that the private market for 
commodities is uncompetitive. The major externality that is considered is the potential 
distortion of exchange rates when one or a few commodities greatly dominate foreign 
exchange market outcomes, as is the case in some oil-producing countries. Governments 
in these countries, with large current account surpluses, want to be careful about the 
potential real appreciation of their currencies and the risk of Dutch Disease. This is not a 
relevant concern for South Africa, as I will argue later.  
A second, more explicitly empiricist approach, is to study the consequences of historical 
episodes of nationalisation. The relevant literature is rather small, no doubt connected to 
the  general  disfavour  of  nationalisation  over  the  last  thirty  years.  There  is  an  older 
literature  comprising  mostly  case  studies  and  often  focussing  on  experiences  in  the 
developed world, especially, in Europe.  
Economic histories of this kind are useful to understand the mechanics and some of the 
consequences of nationalisation. Zambia‟s nationalisation of their copper mines is an 
often-cited example in the resources sector. The government‟s decision to nationalise the 
mines  fits  the  pattern  of  stylised  facts  described  earlier:  high  copper  prices,  and  a 
perception that the private mines were reaping most of the benefits in a society with high 
levels  of  inequality.  That  Zambia‟s  copper  nationalisation  was  a  failure  is  no  longer 
controversial. In fact, this year Zambia‟s president urged the South African government   12 
to learn from their experience and not to nationalise South African mines (Rampedi, 
2011).  
But the reasons for the failure are contested. Sophia du Plessis is amongst those who 
have  identified  a  causal  link  between  the  nationalisation  and  the  adverse  economic 
outcomes, with an institutional argument (Du Plessis, 2005). By contrast, the ANCYL 
(2010: par. 88) has attributed it to “… copper as a strategic commodity in the world 
economy [having] gradually lost value and significance”, though that is not consistent 
with the facts.  
The copper price  did not collapse  after  nationalisation,  though the  peculiar financial 
management of the nationalised mines turned the government inadvertently into “a giant 
copper speculator” in the words of Stoever (1985: 147); and an unhappy speculator at 
that, who ended up with less revenue form its nationalised mines than they would have 
received  in  taxes  under  a  reasonable  counterfactual.  It  was  not  just  poor  financial 
management though; the project was jeopardized by poor mine management, which led 
to a doubling of costs and lower productivity, even though copper mines elsewhere and 
even in neighbouring countries maintained and improved productivity (Stoever, 1985).  
More recent nationalisations in Bolivia, Venezuela and so on have also been studied in 
this  way,  but  these  case  studies  do  not  get  us  all  the  way  to  grasping  what  the 
counterfactual would have been.  
To identify the outcomes of nationalisation, we need to look beyond individual cases to 
answer the question formulated by Sam Peltzman 40 years ago; we wish to discover the 
following “… if a privately owned firm is socialised, and nothing else happens, how will 
the ownership alone affect the firm‟s behaviour?” (Peltzman, 1971).  
To answer this question, we need data sets with variation across institutions, time and 
countries or regions. But this is where the nationalisation literature dries up. Happily, 
there is a way forward as long we regard nationalisation and privatisation as opposite 
movements along a comparable institutional trade-off. 
In  that  case,  we  can  interpret  the  results  from  the  much  larger  literature  on  the 
consequences of privatisation as evidence in the case before us. It still leaves us with the 
considerable  problem  of  endogenous  institutions:  I  have  already  discussed  the  many   13 
reasons why firms might be privately or publically owned, creating the real possibility of 
a selection bias in these data.  
Given these problems, natural experiments have become increasingly important in recent 
years to help answer questions about the differential impact of institutions. Jonathan 
Karpoff (2001) used an esoteric natural experiment to answer Peltzman‟s question: he 
studied the outcome of 35 publically funded and 53 privately funded expeditions to the 
Arctic between 1879 and 1909. He was able to show that the differences in outcomes 
were not due to different goals, technology or nationality. Instead large differences in 
performance (measured as the number of major scientific discoveries, the absences of 
accidents or deaths, and the health of the participants) were observed along the private-
public division of expeditions, with the private ones doing much better. What is more, 
the public expeditions were better funded.  
In Karpoff‟s (2001) econometrics, these differences in efficiency can only be attributed 
to  differences  in  the  quality  of  leadership  structures,  to  differences  in  the  speed  of 
adaptation to new information and incentives. However interesting this result may be, 
one is left wondering whether the result would generalise to more topical activities, such 
as the mining sector.  
A number of papers have asked Peltzman‟s question in a more general setting: Since the 
transport sector has often been a target of nationalisation on public goods grounds, it is 
instructive  to  consider  an  industry-specific  study  of  international  airlines.  Ehrlich, 
Gallais-Hamonno,  Liu  and  Lutter  (1994)  investigated  the  consequences  of  state 
ownership for productivity growth and cost increases in 23 international airlines. They 
found a productivity penalty of 1,5 to 2% per year for state-ownership. 
While one might object to the narrowness of the Ehrlich et al. (1994) and Karpoff (2001) 
studies, these objections fall away for the study of the 500 largest US firms by Boardman 
and Vining (1989), the 500 largest non-financial Canadian firms by Vining and Boardman 
(1992) and the 500 largest non-USA firms by Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). While 
these papers do not all measure the same proxies of efficiency, they all find that after 
controlling  for  size,  market  share,  and  other  firm-specific  features  as  well  as 
macroeconomic features that might impact on the selection of ownership, the private 
firms are significantly more profitable and, where measured, more productive than either 
mixed or outright state-owned enterprises.    14 
Do these results hold for developing countries, especially those where the government is 
suspected of playing an active and positive role in industrial policy? In short, yes. Chinese 
state-owned and mixed enterprises are less productive than comparable private firms, as 
found by Tian (2000), and the same was found for Indian firms by Mujambar (1996) and 
Chong and Lopez de Silanes (2005) for a cross section in Latin America.  
These results should not be read as evidence against the earlier theoretical argument that 
the  degree  of  competition  within  which  firms  operate  plays  an  important  role  in 
determining the relative efficiency of private firms. The point was made most clearly by 
another natural experiment, this time the fate of 17 American firms with substantial 
Japanese and German ownership at the outset of WWII.  
The US government assumed control of these firms when it entered the war on the side 
of the Allies. But the US government acted like a passive investor, leaving the goals and 
management structures as before, partly because government wanted to optimise the 
value of the  firms with an eye towards later re-privatisation, which did occur. After 
controlling for industry-specific features, Kole and Mulherin (1997) showed that these 
temporarily nationalised firms performed no differently on efficiency and profitability 
measures than their private competitors. Not only did these firms operate in competitive 
industries, but Kole and Mulherin (1997) argued that they were left to compete like 
private  firms.  More  generally,  the  empirical  evidence  supports  the  argument  that 
nationalising firms from a competitive private industry and then running with the goals 
and incentives of a public firm is usually inefficient.  
Let me finally turn to the details of the South African case and its likely consequences.  
4. Summary of the likely consequences of the South African debate 
Before I turn to the fiscal case, a brief comment about the possible role of nationalisation 
in a new industrial policy for South Africa. 
South Africa is not amongst those countries where the resources sector causes a massive 
surplus on the current account, which risks local inflation or nominal appreciation, both 
of which might cause real appreciation and Dutch Disease. This potential externality is, 
consequently, no case for nationalising South African mines.  
I  have  already  mentioned  that  nationalisation  of  the  resources  sector  occurs  more 
typically when the potential fiscal gain justifies the action, and this is happens, more   15 
typically, when one or a few commodities account for a large part of economic activity 
and the tax base. In Venezuela, for example, the state-run oil company accounts for 
almost a half of government revenue
4 (Hults, 2007), and in 2005, Bolivian President 
Morales nationalised the hydrocarbon industry (oil and gas) , whence government gets 
roughly a third of its revenue, equal to 10% of GDP (IMF, 2010).   
The comparable data for South Africa is tax revenue of R17. 9 billion from the mining 
sector last year,
5 which was less than 3% of government revenue and just 0.7% of GDP 
(Budget Review, 2011).  
Since the South African debate remains speculative , there is no clear indication of the 
valuation method that will be used to determine the compensation paid to shareholders 
in the event of nationalisation. The ANCYL has argued that nationalisation will be „with 
or without compensation‟ depending on the financial position of the particular mine, but 
the existing South African legal framework does not allow this, nor would the many 
foreign  investment  treaties  by  which  government  has  committed  itself  to  full 
compensation in the event of expropriation (Keeton and White, 2011). This is relevant 
given the international composition of the mining companies‟ shareholders. For example, 
at the end of last year, nearly 53% of AngloGold Ashanti‟s shareholders were American, 
with another roughly 12% residing in the United Kingdom. This leaves very little scope 
for nationalisation without compensation.  
It  follows  that  government  will  have  to  pay;  and  now  it  is  time  to  see  how  much 
government will pay and what it will get in return.   
White and Keeton (2011) calculated that government would get an extra R20.9 billion in 
2010 terms based on the following assumptions: that government nationalises 60% of 
the South African operations of the sector and that efficiency is undiminished. To claim 
these revenues, government would have to buy a 60% stake in the local mines, and this 
would increase government debt by R970 billion on their calculation,
6 compared with 
existing debt of R820 (Keeton and White, 2011: 7 and Budget Review 2011). White and 
                                                        
4 To be precise, 48% in 2007.  
5 Godsell and Spicer (2011) listed the tax revenue as R17.1 billion. The higher estimate is from White and Keeton 
(Keeton and White, 2011).  
6 There is reason to believe that the stock market valuation will be the reference point for compensation in these 
transactions, should they come about. Alternative methods of calculating the value of the firm are time consuming and 
expensive. For example, the British government took ten years from 1946 to 1956 to do their own calculation of the 
value of the coalmines they were intending to nationalise, at a very considerable cost of 5.6 million GBP (Pint, 1990: 
271). It was so costly and time-consuming that they proceeded with stock market evaluations for other industries.   16 
Keeton‟s conservatively estimated cost of servicing the additional debt in 2010 terms 
would be R46.6 billion.  
I have approached the same question in a slightly different way for the three largest gold 
mining  companies,  AngloGold  Ashanti,  Goldfields  and  Harmony.  By  narrowing  the 
question, I was able to isolate the precise value of the revenue generated by their South 
African operations and calculate a proportionate share of their market capitalisation and 
tax payment that can be associated with mining gold in South Africa
7. It is important to 
disentangle the revenues for these multinational companies, as the cost effectiveness can 
vary dramatically in  their portfolios, and at least for the gold mines , the South African 
operations are typically expensive.  
If government nationalised the gold mines, it would have to acquire them at the market 
capitalisation associated with local production and lay claim to all local revenues in 
addition to the taxes already paid. Government‟s net worth would rise if local earnings 
yielded more than the interest rate for the buy-out deal. In step with White and Keeton, I 
assumed conservatively that the government would have to pay 8% on the associated 
debt. Would government have gained 8% or more relative to market capitalisation from 
nationalising these given the mines 2010 results? Would government‟s net worth have 
risen in that year of high gold prices? In short, no.  
Goldfields yielded 7% relative to market capitalisation on local operations in 2010, while 
Harmony reported a net loss and Anglogold Ashanti a yield of 1%. At the disaggregated 
level for large gold mining groups, I have confirmed what White and Keeton (2011) 
found  at  the  sectoral  level,  i.e.  that  nationalising  South  African  mines  would  cost 
government more than government would gain, even under the romantic assumption 
that the mines are run as effectively as under private ownership. It is not too much to say 
that White and Keeton‟s, and my own sobering calculations are best-case scenarios. The 
actual outcome is likely to be worse.  
Since the direct distributional impact of the resource sector is limited, while that of the 
national budget is extensive, it follows that nationalisation will limit the scope for a more 
equitable distribution of income within South Africa.  
                                                        
7 The data was collected from the annual reports of these companies.    17 
What I have said amounts to a strong case against nationalising the resources sector in 
South Africa, and I will summarise it in a few numbered results: 
1.  The  resources  sector  in  South  Africa  does  not  play  a  dominant  role  in  the 
economy, nor does it create the kind of externality associated with the risks of 
Dutch Disease. 
2.  The resources sector is competitive and therefore a poor candidate for public 
ownership.  The  international  evidence  suggests  overwhelmingly  that  the 
nationalised firms would be less efficient in these circumstances. Nationalised 
mines  would  have  confused  goals,  worse  monitoring  and  worse  feedback 
compared with existing mines.  
3.  Nationalising the resources sector will cost government more than it receives. 
This is not only a bad idea in itself, but it will … 
4.  … limit the scope for distributive policies on the national budget.  
5.  As a corollary of the annual fiscal burden, the project would raise government 
debt dramatically at a time when our debt is forecasted to rise sharply for other 
reasons, and the international experience demonstrates the risks associated with 
this path.  
6.  Finally, nationalising the resources sector will undermine support for those very 
market-based institutions we need in order to achieve a higher long-run growth 
trajectory.  
While economic theory and the international experience help us to understand why we 
are having this debate, the evidence suggests that nationalising the resources sector in 
South Africa is demonstrably a poor policy initiative. Nationalisation is not an attractive 
rediscovery that will lead us back to a prosperous future; instead it will lead us down a 
policy rabbit hole.  
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